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Modifying the Restrictions on Sentence Modification: 
United States v. Cobb 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As of January 29, 2011, approximately 191,000 inmates were 
serving sentences in federal prisons across the United States;1 of 
these sentences that were handed down in 2008, nearly ninety-six 
percent were the result of a plea agreement.2 In the federal criminal 
system, the Sentencing Commission attempts to ensure that 
defendants receive similar sentences for similar crimes by establishing 
sentencing guidelines—a range in which defendants should be 
sentenced for a particular crime.3 In part because judges are required 
to consider the guidelines when issuing a sentence,4 the guidelines 
play a key role in plea negotiations, serving as a basis upon which 
prosecutors and defendants try to determine the best “deal.”5 The 
Sentencing Commission reviews and adjusts the guidelines from time 
to time based on a variety of factors.6 While in most cases a court 
cannot modify a sentence once it is imposed, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) offers an exception when the defendant’s sentence was 
based on a guideline that was subsequently reduced.7 In theory, this 
prevents a defendant who was sentenced before a guideline 
 
 1. Quick Facts, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (Jan. 29, 2011), 
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp. 
 2. 2008 Annual Report Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Fig. C, UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ 
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2008/FigC.pdf. 
 3. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/ 
Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
 4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 (2009); 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b)(1) (2006). Under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court is 
not “required” to always follow the guidelines. However, it may be an abuse of discretion for a 
court to sentence outside the guidelines.  
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Bundy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009), appeal 
dismissed, vacated in part, 2010 WL 3516574 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 03, 2010); United States v. 
Carrasquillo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65671 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2009); United States v. 
Franklin, 600 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no doubt that the parties considered the 
guidelines range during their negotiations . . . .”). 
 6. See 28 U.S.C. §  994(n)–(p), (r)–(s) (2006). 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). 
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reduction from receiving a longer sentence than a defendant 
convicted of the same crime but sentenced after the reduction.  
For several years this exception had its own very large exception 
because circuit courts held that when a defendant entered into a 
Rule 11 plea agreement, his sentence was based solely on the 
agreement—even if the defendant, prosecutor, and court consulted 
the guidelines—thus making him ineligible for a sentence 
modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).8 In United States v. 
Cobb,9 the Tenth Circuit joined what may be a new trend in 
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3582 by holding that a sentence pursuant 
to a plea agreement may be based on the sentencing guidelines as 
well as the Rule 11 agreement, thus making these defendants eligible 
for sentence modifications. This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit 
was correct in applying a broader interpretation of § 3582. Part II 
outlines the facts and procedural history of Cobb. Part III then 
discusses the legal background and basis for other circuits’ narrow 
interpretation of the “based on” language of § 3582. Part IV 
describes the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Cobb. Finally, Part V 
discusses how the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation is well within the 
statutory language and more in line with the purpose behind the 
sentencing guidelines. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Cobb was charged with four crack cocaine-related offenses in 
March 1999; he entered into a Rule 11(e)(1)(C)10 agreement, and 
ultimately pled guilty to possession of 1000.5 grams of cocaine with 
intent to distribute.11 The plea agreement stated that the sentence 
would be determined by applying the sentencing guidelines, noted 
that the guideline range was 168 to 210 months, and stipulated to a 
sentence of 168 months, “the bottom of the applicable guideline 
range.”12 At the sentencing hearing, the judge took note of the 
guideline range and, finding no reason to depart from it, imposed 
 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 372–73, 379 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 
869, 870 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 9. 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated and reinstated, 603 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
 10. Now Rule 11(c)(1)(C). 
 11. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981. 
 12. Id.  
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the 168-month sentence, explaining that the “sentence [was] within 
the guideline range.”13  
In December 2007, the Sentencing Commission unanimously 
reduced the sentencing guideline range base offense by two levels for 
crack cocaine-related offenses and made the reduction retroactive, 
effective March 2008.14 Under the revised crack cocaine guidelines, 
the sentencing range for Cobb’s offense dropped from 168 months 
to 135.15 When the revisions became retroactive, Cobb moved for a 
new sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),16 which allows a 
court to consider modifying a sentence when the original sentence is 
“based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by 
the Sentencing Commission.”17 Cobb argued that his sentence 
should be reduced to the bottom of the new range because the 
sentence in his plea agreement was so tied to the guideline range that 
his sentence was necessarily “based on” the guidelines.18 The 
government argued that the sentence was based on the parties’ Rule 
11 agreement, not the sentencing guidelines, but at the § 3582 
hearing the prosecutor acknowledged that had the guidelines been 
different at the time of sentencing, the plea agreement would also 
have been different.19 The district court determined that the sentence 
“rest[ed] squarely on the parties’ agreement,” and “as a matter of 
fact and law” the sentence could not also be based on the 
guidelines.20 Because the court found that the sentence was based on 
Rule 11 and not the guideline range, it concluded that § 3582 did 
not grant it authority to reduce the sentence and thus dismissed 
Cobb’s modification motion for lack of jurisdiction.21 
 
 13. Id. at 982. 
 14. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, Supplement to app. C, 
Amendment 706 (Nov. 1, 2007) (regarding 2-level reduction); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
GUIDELINE MANUAL, Supplement to app. c, Amendment 713 (Nov. 1, 2009) (regarding 
retroactivity).  
 15. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 982. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). 
 18. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 982.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 14, United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 
2009) (No. 08-1213) (quoting Record on Appeal vol. V at 28).  
 21. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
With few exceptions, a court cannot modify a sentence once it is 
imposed.22 One exception is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows 
the court to reduce the sentence “in the case of a defendant who has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission,” provided that the reduction is consistent with the 
commission’s policies.23 Though seemingly straightforward, the 
interpretation of § 3582’s “based on” language is anything but 
settled for sentences involving a plea agreement. The circuits that 
have addressed the issue take opposing views, often with a vigorous 
dissent promoting the majority position in another circuit, thus 
making it clear that the question could have easily gone the other 
way.24  
A. Majority View—Narrow Construction of “Based On” 
The majority of circuits hold that a Rule 11 agreement precludes 
application of § 3582(c)(2) by either applying a narrow 
interpretation of § 3582’s “based on” language, or borrowing 
common law contract principles and applying them to plea 
agreements.25 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Peveler 
determined that even if the plea agreement did no more than specify 
an offense level, thus leaving the sentence to be determined from the 
guidelines, because the case involved a plea agreement, the sentence 
was based exclusively on the agreement and could not be based on a 
guideline range for purposes of § 3582.26 Thus, defendants who 
plea-bargain do not fall under the § 3582(c)(2) exception, and the 
 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 
 23. Id. § 3582(c)(2). 
 24. See, e.g., Cobb, 584 F.3d 979; United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 
2009); United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 25. The Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits take this position. See Sanchez, 562 
F.3d 275; United States v. Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bride, 
581 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 372–73, 379 (6th Cir. 
2003).  
 26. 359 F.3d at 372–73, 379; see also United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a sentence imposed under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) arises directly from 
the agreement itself, not from the guidelines). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:30 PM 
17 Modifying the Restrictions on Sentence Modification 
 21 
court has no authority to modify their sentences when the guidelines 
change.27 
In addition to holding that a plea agreement precludes 
application of § 3582, majorities in the Third and Eighth Circuits, 
and a dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit, also emphasize the 
contractual nature of plea agreements.28 In the Third Circuit, the 
majority in United States v. Sanchez29 noted that even without the 
dispute over what it means for a sentence to be “based on” the 
guidelines, a plea agreement is a contract which binds all parties: the 
defendant, government, and the court.30 In agreeing to a sentence, 
the defendant gets what she bargained for, and a court does not have 
the power to revise a contract if all parties do not agree to the 
change.31 Just as a consumer cannot renegotiate an automobile 
purchase when the price goes down a few years later, a defendant 
cannot modify his sentence when the sentencing guidelines change.32  
The Second Circuit appears to adopt this majority view. Recent 
decisions involved distinguishable fact scenarios—defendants were 
sentenced outside the applicable range,33 according to a statutory 
minimum,34 or under a set of guidelines that had not been reduced.35 
However, in an unpublished opinion, the court gave a nod of 
approval to the line of cases that holds that the existence of a plea 
agreement precludes application of § 3582 in all circumstances.36 
 
 27. Peveler, 359 F.3d at 379. 
 28. See Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 280; Scurlark, 560 F.3d at 842; Dews, 551 F.3d at 212 
(Agee, J., dissenting); id. at 283 (Rendell, J., concurring).  
 29. Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 280 (“[A] sentence prescribed in a binding plea agreement is 
not ‘based on’ a subsequently lowered sentencing range.”). 
 30. Id. at 282. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 282 n.7. 
 33. United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 34. United States v. Torres, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18306 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 35. United States v. Castillo, 378 F. App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 36. United States v. Kornegay, 358 F. App’x 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2009). Kornegay’s 
explicit approval of the strict view may be a response to United States v. Fruster, 669 F. Supp. 
2d 341, 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2009), where a district court granted a sentence reduction, holding 
that a plea agreement does not automatically preclude modification under § 3582(c)(2).  
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B. Minority View: United States v. Dews 
In contrast, the majority in United States v. Dews37 and the 
dissenting judge in Sanchez argued that in cases where the guidelines 
played a central role in determining the agreed sentence, “it strains 
credulity to imagine that the plea agreement was not based on the 
Guidelines.”38 In Dews, the court held that nothing in Rule 11 
precludes a court from modifying a sentence under § 3582, nor does 
§ 3582 require that the sentencing range be the sole basis for the 
sentence.39 In certain circumstances, “a sentence may be both a 
guidelines-based sentence . . . and a sentence stipulated to by the 
parties in a plea agreement.”40 The dissent in Sanchez agreed, noting 
that a defendant who agrees to a plea agreement does not 
automatically waive his right to seek resentencing, and courts should 
not reduce incentives to enter plea agreements by making those 
defendants ineligible for a sentence modification in the event the 
guidelines change.41  
C. Undecided Circuits—Possible Trend Towards the Minority View 
Until this year, the Seventh Circuit seemed to follow the 
majority view,42 but that appears to be changing. In United States v. 
Franklin,43 the court held that the defendant’s sentence could not be 
reduced under § 3582 because there was no indication that the 
parties intended to tie the stipulated sentence to the sentencing 
guidelines.44 However, had the agreement made some reference to 
the guidelines, the court concluded that it might have had authority 
to review the defendant’s sentence for a possible reduction under 
§ 3582.45 
 
 37. 551 F.3d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 2008) (vacated as moot). The panel decision was 
vacated when the court agreed to hear the case en banc. While their decision was pending, 
Dews completed his unmodified sentence and was released. 
 38. United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2009) (Roth, J., dissenting). 
 39. Dews, 551 F.3d at 209, 212. 
 40. Id. at 209. 
 41. Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 283. 
 42. See United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“[a] sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea arises directly from the agreement itself, 
not from the [g]uidelines”). 
 43. 600 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 44. Id. at 896. 
 45. Id. at 896–97. 
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The Fifth Circuit currently appears to agree with the majority; 
however, there is room in its case law to go either way. In United 
States v. Garcia, the court applied a hybrid approach, concluding 
that a defendant who was sentenced on the high end of the original 
guidelines was eligible for a reduction, but the sentence could not be 
reduced below the plea agreement’s 240-month minimum.46 
Although the Fifth Circuit seemed to grant district courts 
jurisdiction to consider a reduction under § 3582, it also adopted 
the contract approach, stating that because plea agreements are 
binding on all parties, a court cannot modify a sentence beyond what 
is allowed in the Rule 11 agreement.47  
D. Tenth Circuit Precedent: United States v. Trujeque 
Until Cobb, United States v. Trujeque48 was the leading Tenth 
Circuit opinion addressing sentence modifications in plea agreement 
situations and was relied on by other circuits as establishing that a 
plea agreement precludes the application of § 3582.49  
Trujeque was indicted on various charges relating to possession 
and distribution of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (“LSD”); he pled 
guilty and agreed to a sentence of eighty-four months.50 Trujeque 
later moved for a reduced sentence based on the then-recently 
revised LSD sentencing guidelines, but the court determined that 
because Trujeque was sentenced pursuant to the stipulated 
agreement, his sentence was not based on a sentencing range that 
was subsequently lowered.51 The stipulated sentence was outside the 
calculated range, but the court stated that this fact was immaterial to 
its analysis.52  
 
 46. 606 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 100 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 339 F. App’x 872 (10th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Schurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 50. Trujeque, 100 F.3d at 870. 
 51. Id. at 870–71. 
 52. Id. at 871 n.3. 
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IV. UNITED STATES V. COBB  
In United States v. Cobb,53 the Tenth Circuit broke from the 
majority view, going against the common interpretation of Trujeque, 
and concluding that a Rule 11 plea agreement does not preclude 
application of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because parties often look to 
the sentencing guidelines in determining a stipulated sentence, it is 
“unrealistic” to claim that such sentences are not based on a 
guideline range.54  
A. Cobb’s Plea Agreement 
The multiple references to the sentencing guidelines in the 
negotiation process, final agreement, and at sentencing were 
important factors in the court’s conclusion. During sentencing, the 
trial judge told Cobb that the guidelines helped define his sentence, 
and he saw no reason to depart from the guidelines. He also said that 
the guidelines set out by the parties were correct, and the stipulated 
sentence was the bottom of the guideline range.55 In addition, 
during the § 3582 hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged that “if the 
[g]uidelines had been a different number . . . probably the [p]lea 
[a]greement would have been a different number.”56 To the Tenth 
Circuit, these facts indicated that Cobb’s sentence “was tied to the 
guidelines at every step.”57 
B. Distinguishing Trujeque 
Although many courts, and the dissent in Cobb, cite Trujeque as 
precedent for not allowing a court to consider a reduction when the 
party enters into a plea agreement, its factual differences made it easy 
for the majority to dismiss its precedential value. The guideline range 
in Trujeque was 121 to 151 months, but the plea agreement called 
 
 53. United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 595 
F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010), original opinion reinstated, 603 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2010). After 
the decision was filed, the Tenth Circuit granted the United States’ petition for rehearing en 
banc and vacated the initial decision. Following briefing and rehearing, the original opinion 
was reinstated. 
 54. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 985. 
 55. Id. at 981, 984. 
 56. Id. at 982 (citing the record) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. at 983. 
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for eighty-four months, well outside the guideline range, making it 
clear that his sentence was not based on the guidelines.58 
The majority argued that Cobb’s situation was more similar to 
the defendant in Dews, where the sentencing court accepted the plea 
agreements only after confirming that the stipulated sentences fell 
within the guidelines.59 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding that “nothing in the language of § 3582(c)(2) or 
in the language of Rule 11 precludes a defendant who pleads guilty 
under Rule 11 . . . from later benefitting from a favorable retroactive 
guideline amendment.”60 A sentence may be based on both the 
guidelines and a Rule 11 plea agreement when the stipulated 
sentence falls within the guideline range.61 
The Tenth Circuit also rejected other circuits’ practice of treating 
plea agreements as contracts that cannot be changed without 
agreement by both parties. “We are construing a statute, not 
common law. Importing contract ideas into our assessment of 
§ 3582 . . . misdirect[s] our focus . . . .”62 The court found no 
indication that Congress intended to limit eligibility for a sentence 
reduction to only non-negotiated sentences; the language of the 
statute “generally allows for reductions of sentences which are based 
in any way on a qualifying range.”63  
C. Policy Considerations 
Though not a large portion of the opinion, the court cited the 
policy reasons behind sentencing guidelines to further reinforce its 
decision. One of Congress’s goals in creating the sentencing 
commission was to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentencing.64 
Because plea agreements comprise over ninety percent of all 
sentences, barring these defendants from receiving a modification 
under § 3582 undermines this goal.65 The narrow interpretation also 
ignores the significant role the guidelines play in helping parties 
 
 58. Id. (citing United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 870 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 984–85. 
 63. Id. at 985. 
 64. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)). 
 65. Id.  
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negotiate an appropriate sentence.66 For the Tenth Circuit, “[i]t is 
simply unrealistic to think that the applicable guideline range is not a 
major factor (if not the major factor) in reaching a stipulated 
sentence.”67  
D. Dissent 
Judge Hartz’s dissent followed the more common interpretation 
of § 3582—that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11 
agreement is based on the agreement, not the guidelines, and is thus 
ineligible for modification under § 3582, even if the parties 
considered the guidelines when forming their agreement.68 Judge 
Hartz quoted the agreement language, “[t]he parties agree that this 
plea agreement is entered into pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
11(e)(1)(C),” as proof that the sentence was based on Rule 11 and 
not the guidelines.69 He acknowledged that the parties and 
sentencing judge looked at the guidelines, but emphasized that it 
was just one of several factors that were considered.70  
The dissent argued that the majority interpreted § 3582(c)(2)’s 
language so broadly, allowing any guidelines-based sentence to 
satisfy the restriction, that virtually every sentence is eligible for 
modification.71 Under the majority’s reading, a plea agreement could 
be modified if any “one of the essential parties—the prosecutor, the 
defendant, or the district court—considered the guidelines in 
deciding whether the stipulated sentence was a good idea.”72 
Because parties always look at the guidelines, Judge Hartz feared 
that the majority had opened the door for almost every sentence to 
be modified.73  
Judge Hartz argued that a sentence should be eligible for 
modification “based on a sentencing range” only if the guideline 
range was miscalculated.74 Because Cobb could not have appealed his 
sentence on the ground that the range was miscalculated, his 
 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 985 (Hartz, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 986. 
 70. Id. at 987.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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sentence was not “based on a guidelines sentencing range and 
cannot be modified under § 3582(c)(2).”75  
The dissent also pointed out that while the facts of Trujeque 
were different, the difference was immaterial because that case did 
not rely on the fact that the sentence was outside the guidelines 
range.76 Furthermore, the majority erred by relying on Dews because 
that opinion was vacated when the court agreed to hear the case en 
banc.77 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) is well within 
the statutory language. Cobb does not automatically reduce every 
stipulated sentence. Rather, as stated by the statute, it merely grants 
the district court discretion to review the sentence and decide “if 
such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.”78 While this will require 
courts to look at the actual merits of motions for sentence reduction 
rather than simply dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction, this 
interpretation is more consistent with the intent of the statute and 
the policies behind the sentencing guidelines.  
A. Cobb’s Interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) Is Well Within the Statutory 
Language 
In granting courts authority to reduce certain sentences, 
§ 3582(c)(2) makes no distinction between sentences imposed 
following a trial and those imposed following a plea deal.79 All that is 
required is that the sentence be “based on” a guideline range that is 
subsequently lowered. During plea negotiations, parties almost 
always look to the guidelines in order to determine whether the 
suggested agreement is fair.80 And even after the prosecutor and 
 
 75. Id. at 988. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. Dews was vacated for a rehearing en banc, but the case was dismissed without an 
opinion because Dews completed his sentence before the case was reheard. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 600 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is 
no doubt that the parties considered the guidelines range during their negotiations.”); United 
States v. Bundy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Carrasquillo, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 65671 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2009); United States v. Oliver, 589 F. Supp. 2d 39, 40 
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defendant have formed an agreement, the district court is required to 
look at the guidelines when imposing the sentence.81 Considering 
that courts readily acknowledge that prosecutors and defense 
attorneys depend heavily on the guidelines in determining plea deals, 
the Tenth Circuit is correct in calling it “unrealistic” to think that 
the resulting sentences are not based on the guidelines. This is 
especially true in Cobb’s case, where the plea agreement indicated 
several times that it was based on the applicable guidelines.82 In 
addition, because the statute is unclear as to whether it can be 
applied in plea agreements, the rule of lenity should apply to 
interpret the statute in favor of the accused.83 
The majority was also correct in refusing to apply contract 
principles when interpreting criminal statutes. Characterizing plea 
agreements as simple contracts that are final and binding on both 
parties84 overlooks the fact that modern criminal law is based on 
statute, not common law, and there is no authority for importing 
common law into criminal statutes.85 A guilty plea “involves the 
waiver of at least three constitutional rights by a defendant . . . 
therefore, the analogy of a plea agreement to a traditional contract is 
not complete or precise, and the application of ordinary contract law 
principles to a plea agreement is not always appropriate.”86 Even if a 
plea agreement is binding, common law principles borrowed from 
contract law are superseded by § 3582’s express provision allowing 
for a sentence’s revision when it is based on the sentencing 
guidelines. Finally, comparing plea deals to commercial contracts 
seems inappropriate, as criminal law and sentencing deal with a 
 
(D.D.C. 2008) (“Certainly, the sentencing guidelines may have some bearing on what 
sentence a defendant decides to plead to because they help inform the defendant of what 
sentence he could be facing in the event that he decides to go to trial.”). 
 81. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 (2009). 
 82. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981, 982 (majority opinion). 
 83. Few courts have examined the application of the rule of lenity in sentencing statutes, 
but some courts indicate that it may apply. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 329 F.3d 1229, 
1230 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
 84. See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 
2008) (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 85. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981, 984. But see United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 375 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
 86. Peveler, 359 F.3d at 375 (quoting United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th 
Cir. 1990)). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:30 PM 
17 Modifying the Restrictions on Sentence Modification 
 29 
defendant’s life and liberty—issues much more significant than the 
price of a commodity.  
B. The Tenth Circuit Is Not Bound by Neighboring Circuits 
While the majority of circuits take a stricter interpretation of 
what it means for a sentence to be “based on” the sentencing 
guidelines, nothing prevents the Tenth Circuit from adjusting its 
prior interpretation of § 3582. In addition, the recent crack cocaine 
amendments appear to have prompted other circuits to reconsider 
their prior interpretations and move in the direction of Cobb.  
The dissent makes a strong argument in noting that because 
Trujeque did not look to whether the sentence was within the 
guideline range, the factual distinction alone is not firm enough 
ground for adopting a completely different interpretation.87 
However, there are circumstances where a court should re-examine 
past reasoning to prevent perpetuating an incorrect decision, 
particularly when a different interpretation does no violence to the 
statutory language.  
Although the dissent was correct that Dews was vacated as moot, 
the majority did not wholly rely on Dews in determining that a 
sentence could be based on more than one factor. Rather, it did 
what courts often do when facing a legal question—it looked at 
various arguments and adopted those it found most persuasive.  
C. Sentence Reduction Is Not Automatic 
The majority’s interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) will not allow 
nearly every sentence to be modified because the statute places 
additional limits on whether a sentence can be reduced. In addition, 
many sentences are based on additional factors or guidelines other 
than those that were reduced.  
The statute makes it clear that a revision in the guidelines does 
not make a sentence reduction automatic; rather, the court must 
consider “the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that 
they are applicable” and grant a reduction “if such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”88 These factors include the nature and circumstances 
 
 87. United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 871 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). 
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of the offense, the history of the defendant, and the need to show 
the public the seriousness of the offense.89 Cobb does not remove 
these statutory limits; it simply grants the district court the authority 
to review a plea agreement where the sentence was based on a 
reduced guideline and decide whether the sentencing factors warrant 
a reduced sentence.  
Another limit to Cobb’s effect on sentence reduction is that, in 
many cases, a defendant is sentenced based on a mandatory 
minimum or career offender calculation, rather than the particular 
set of guidelines that were subsequently reduced.90 In these cases, a 
defendant cannot be considered for a modified sentence. 
D. Purpose and Policy 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of § 3582 is correct in 
light of the purpose and policy behind the sentencing guidelines. 
The Sentencing Commission was created in part to “provide 
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal 
conduct.”91 This purpose is defeated when a defendant who is 
sentenced within the guidelines after going to trial is eligible to 
receive a reduced sentence, while a defendant who is charged with a 
similar crime and sentenced within the guidelines after negotiating a 
plea deal is ineligible. The public interest in promoting plea bargains 
(in part because they save the time and expense of preparing for and 
conducting a full trial) is undermined when defendants who plea 
receive the additional punishment of being ineligible for a sentence 
reduction for no reason other than they saved public resources by 
not going to trial.92  
 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Tupuola, 587 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a defendant was ineligible for a sentence reduction because his sentence was based on 
career offender rather than crack cocaine guidelines).  
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 92. United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2009) (Roth, J., dissenting). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that a sentence based 
on sentencing guidelines should receive the same treatment under 
§ 3582, regardless of whether sentencing occurred after a trial or as 
the result of a plea agreement. Nothing in § 3582 states that plea 
agreements based on sentencing guidelines cannot be considered for 
a subsequent modification, or that the sentencing range must be the 
sole basis of a sentence in order for the statute to apply. The Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Cobb does not mean that defendants’ sentences 
will be automatically modified every time the guidelines are reduced; 
rather, it allows the district courts to consider sentencing factors and 
policies to determine if a reduction is appropriate. While it will 
require courts to look at the merits of a case rather than simply 
dismissing it out of hand, a more careful review is required in order 
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